Peace for the Koreas but not for the United States

This week’s Inter-Korean Summit meeting between Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) leader Kim Jong-un and South Korean president Moon Jae-in was considered historic for a number of reasons.

For one it is reported that among others, the meeting was meant to formally end the 1950s-era Korean War by singing a peace treaty, or formally known as the Panmunjom Declaration for Peace, Prosperity and Unification of the Korean Peninsula. The Korean War was a conflict that eventually split the Korea into two countries as a result of the anti-communist hysteria during the early days of the Cold War. Armed hostilities ended in July 27, 1953 but the two new states are technically still at war since no truce has been signed.

Also of importance is the Kim’s proposal to rid the peninsula of nuclear weapons during the summit at the border truce town of Panmunjon in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). The communist leader said he will invite experts and journalists from South Korea and the United States for inspection of the proposed shuttering of its Punggye-ri nuclear test site, which might happen as early as this May according to the South Korean government.

North Korea first detonated its nuclear bomb in an illegal weapon test in October 9, 2006 largely as a result of its own research. As it turned out the nuke test was Pyongyang’s leverage to receive aid in exchange for disabling this capability in a series of six-party talks involving the two Koreas, China, Russia, Japan, and the United States.

Previous summits between North Korea and South Korea have taken place in 2000 and 2007 but did not bring peace between the two especially as the United States continued to provoke Pyongyang with large invasion military exercises around the DPRK.

Washington’s reaction

After the April 27 summit between the two sides, United States president Donald Trump tweeted “Korean War to End! The United States and all of its great people, should be very proud of what is now taking place in Korea!” as if to imply that the Washington played a major role.

Remember that just this year the unpredictable president spoke of brinkmanship when he responded to Pyongyang’s New Year’s day speech, stating in a Tweet that “will someone from his depleted and food starved regime please inform him that I too have  Nuclear Button, but it is much bigger & more powerful one than his, and my Button works!”

In a follow-up statement seemingly to placate his earlier pompous assertion, Trump Tweeted that “please do not forget the great help that my good friend, President Xi of China, has given to the United States, particularly at the Border of North Korea. Without him it would have been a much longer, tougher, process!”

Conservative media outlets and pundits have even hinted that Trump deserves the Nobel Peace Prize, just because of the president’s “tough stance” against North Korea and the pressure resulting from hard-hitting economic sanctions after last year’s series of nuclear tests. Note that the Nobel Committee is not immune to politics too when back former US president Barack Obama received the peace prize in 2010 after just a few months of becoming American president.

Although president Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un are scheduled to meet in a few weeks either in Singapore, Mongolia, or South Korea. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo the upcoming meetings will focus on the issue of denuclearization. For his part, US Defense Secretary James Mattis in a phone conversation with his South Korean counterpart said that the United States will maintain “ironclad commitment…using the full spectrum of US capabilities” for its ally.

Peace in the Peninsula is not welcome

And this is where issues might get complicated. Experts anticipate the DPRK’s wish list might include the withdrawal of all American nuclear-capable weapons in the region, and possibly the removal of the United States’ 28,500 troops from South Korea. This might prove to be a non-negotiable demand for Washington, which has maintained bases in numerous countries it ‘liberated’ during World War II.

As with the White House’s unacceptable sabotaging of peace in the Middle East (particularly the alleged Syrian chemical weapons attack recently), the American hunger for armed, diplomatic, and economic conflict will only continue to derail peace elsewhere, and the Korean Peninsula is no exception.

Beyond the initial euphoria for this most recent Inter-Korean Summit, the real international community must cautiously observe possible “incidents” that might “suddenly happen” and give the United States another “concern” about Pyongyang’s “sincerity” about making peace in the region.

Berlin Wall Politics: 25 Years Later

The past 25 years since the symbolic collapse of the Berlin Wall and the accompanying disintegration of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union itself has left many hopes unfulfilled and more fears realized. To the disappointment of many, the once euphoric atmosphere back then, stemming from the easing of East-West relations, has stayed only in that specific era.

The time marker may be 10, 15, 20, and now 25 years, but one thing has remained the same, the prime political situation in Europe remains: that of the continued antagonism between the West and Russia, especially because of the persistent expansion of NATO towards Eastern Europe and on to Russia.

The last Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, a man thoroughly celebrated in the West because of his openness and reform policies and perhaps the last remaining ‘elder’ of that significant era, may have expired his relevance in Russian politics and international relations, but what has remained constant is his correctly-judged observations about who’s to blame in the revival of East-West tensions in Europe and beyond.

Gorbachev, ‘Gorby’ as he was fondly called in the West back then, has been assured of a military block that will not expand ‘an inch’ to the Soviet sphere of influence. Contrary to mainstream Western literature, the term ‘influence’ was agreed upon by the victors of World War II, the most tangible evidence of which is the agreed division of Germany and capital Berlin, together with the rest of Europe. Today, NATO, the first pan-European military alliance established after the Great War, remains, while its counterpart, the equally formidable Warsaw Pact, has ceased to exist. Gorbachev and his communist allies in Europe knew that to achieve peace in Europe, the arms race must go, and with it a promise that NATO will remain at bay ‘where they are right now’ back in the late 1980s.

Since that fateful day of German reunification, NATO has expanded four times since 1999, adding not only former Warsaw Pact members but also former Soviet republics, and has committed itself to the destruction of Yugoslavia (which deeply hurt a weak Russia in the 1990s), the Western-backed secession of Kosovo, and today the unnecessary blood bath in Ukraine, on the Russian border itself.

It is unfortunate that the only remaining elder statesman of that era (which include Reagan, Thatcher, Pope John Paul),only  Gorbachev has survived to tell how mistaken the situation in Europe has become because of the unchecked triumphalism and arrogance of leaders from the West has become, from crook American politicians John McCain to NATO’s top generals and EU plutocrats. The problem stems from how the West treats Russian national interests as irrelevant and similar to a deeply weakened and humiliated Russia in the 1990s.

 An economic and military powerhouse today, Russia has stood in the way of continued Western bullying and disregard for ‘the rest’ opposite ‘the West’. From its reluctance to let Syria fall, to Ukraine’s destruction, Moscow has seen it fit to check this inexorable spread of bogus ‘democracy’ by getting in the way of the American habit of ‘regime change’ and ‘humanitarian intervention’. Indeed, Russia has come a long way since the dissolution of the USSR, and the time has come for the West to come to terms with a changing international order, one that has seen a multipolar world replace a once unipolar but abusive world lead by the United States.

Although talks of a new Cold War is in the air (some call it premature because of the lack of ideological differences), the wall that has deeply divided East and West relations is perhaps unparalleled in the past 25 years.  There is no comparable division that has existed since the end of the Cold War, from American-backed sanctions against Russia (insulating the US but harming the EU), treating Russia like a third-rate country (Russia’s nuclear weapons alone guarantee its weight in international relations), to increased encroachment of military spheres (the regular presence of American warships in the Black Sea, a Russian naval stronghold, and military aircraft patrols in former Soviet republics), to the relentless demonizing of Putin and Russia (Obama comparing Russia to Ebola), and the recent fear mongering against the Sochi Olympics.

As for Europe itself, it has become nothing but a tool of Washington’s arm to antagonize Moscow. It has become voiceless and surrogate to American wishes, perhaps making Gorbachev’s recent statement true, that “ instead of becoming a leader of change in a global world Europe has turned into an arena of political upheaval, of competition for the spheres of influence, and finally of military conflict. The consequence inevitably is Europe’s weakening at a time when other centers of power and influence are gaining moment. If this continues, Europe will lose a strong voice in world affairs and gradually become irrelevant.”

Social Upheaval of the Times: A New Perspective

The span of time since the unraveling of socialism a little over twenty years ago has given us, contemporary observers, the opportunity to look at this event with unprecedented depth and a bigger perspective. Indeed, that span has uncovered and brought back from obscurity the real factors that contributed to the collapse of this ideology, very much like how history is vindicated well after it has unfolded. What is obvious to us today surely was not clear for that age's participants and observers, thus, a better say on what truly happened, from the personalities who betrayed socialism to the unwelcome external elements that intervened, is aching to be told especially in this time of mass protests in Europe and privacy scandals plaguing America.

Almost exactly twenty years before the financial blunder of the West, Eastern Europe was undergoing a major political transformation; the masses are confronted with a choice that would dictate how their lives will be from then on: to keep under socialism or to succumb to the allure of the supposedly more democratic ways of their Western neighbors. The reverse is true today: Americans are increasingly becoming aware but less patient with how they should be governed, from how taxpayer money should be used in times of crisis to how their private lives are eroded by an increasingly paranoid government. Without realizing it, people are citing elements of socialism to serve as antidote (Occupy Movement) to the woes of contemporary life in 'the land of the free.' In Europe, calls for a loosening of the highly bureaucratic and elitist European Union is needless to say, gaining more ground as state after state succumb to strings-attached-ridden bailouts and the claws of austerity measures eating at people's welfare and ultimately, their existence.

How can you preach 'democracy' when you treat your citizens with distrust, as with the recent Manning-Assange-Snowden expose reveal? In fact, even America's allies can't escape this inexorable surveillance menace. How can you preach 'more integration' for the so-called European Union if you continue to keep out the assignment of management of the continent beyond the approval of citizens? Such trappings were the wedge of classic anti-socialist/communist rhetoric during the Cold War. Can we look at who's speaking now? Indeed we can, with the help of what others call "the ordeal of careful scrutiny."

With Age Comes Greater Understanding: The Truth behind Socialism's Collapse in the 1980s

The typical Western triumphalist thinking has all the success-over-socialism-the-enemy covered in the Cold War dialogue, where claims rest mostly in the belief that socialism is doomed from the beginning, as was the case with the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. In the specific case of the dissolution of the USSR, there are six theories that try to 'explain' why socialism failed, including:

• flaws of socialism
• popular opposition
• external factors
• bureaucratic counter-revolution
• lack of democracy and over-centralization, and
• the Gorbachev factor

The first theory argues that socialism was doomed from the start because it had an inherent anti-human nature flaw. It is misguided thought because it requires a predisposition that socialism in the USSR should've failed before even more pressing challenges, such as collectivization or the Nazi invasion, had gripped the relatively young socialist state.

The second theory subscribes to the idea that popular opposition brought down socialism in the Soviet Union and even Eastern Europe. However, subscribers to this theory fail to explain the fact that a real opposition to Gorbachev did not turn out in the beginning of his reforms. To begin with, mass discontent did not appear during Gorbachev's early years as General Secretary. Moreover, surveys showed that people were actually satisfied with their lives and the system.

While others falsely believed that, some were comfortable with blaming external factors as behind the collapse of socialism in the Soviet Union. Proponents of this theory believe in the pressure that Reagan put on the reforming Soviet system, especially on military terms. On the contrary, despite rhetorical musings, there is no evidence of such triumphalism, especially on the buildup of arms that was supposed to 'bankrupt' the Soviets into spending. In fact, archives show that the American military buildup was not reciprocated by the armed forces of the Soviet Union. Proponents of this theory fail to cite the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and the plan of Gorbachev to end conscription in the military as well as the eventual reduction of the armed forces.

The fourth theory promote the belief that as Gorbachev's reforms unleashed forces beyond the control of the state, slow-moving leaders were left with no choice but to ride the waves of a fast-emerging market economy by privatizing state assets for their own wealth. Although some in the elite saw an opportunity in the unraveling of the centralized economy, it was motivated by their interest in hanging on to power, rather than subscribing to the return of capitalism.

The fifth theory traces the root of the Soviet collapse to the inability of the state to "democraticize", at least in the Western sense of the word. However, over time, the meaning of democracy changes. In Roger Keeran's and Thomas Kenny's thesis, neither capitalism nor liberalism has an exclusive claim to democracy. To be sure, democracy came to the United States in gradual terms, and was constantly improved as rights became more pervasive and expanded. In fact, 'popular participation' was built-in in the Soviet political and decision-making system. Indeed, the spread of power was even more dispersed than in a Western democracy. As for over-centralization, scholars miss the fact that the USSR was the first socialist country to embark on such economic path; there is no guarantee the plan will work, but nevertheless it produced a system that will achieve the goals of socialism, including free education, housing, guaranteed jobs, zero-inflation and others.

The sixth theory also has the trappings of an incomplete thesis: that Gorbachev was the man to blame, especially because of his abandonment of traditional communism. There is no denying that Gorbachev's policies unleashed wanton forces beyond his control. However, few recall that his earlier policies where a mirror of Andropov's reforms. At best, this theory fails to fully convince, especially since Gorbachev, according to Keeran and Kenny, "was both a legatee of a certain tradition and the product of his times and not just a lone factor making history."

Rebuffing Western Though on the Collapse: Other Areas of Discussion

Even after the end of the First World War, it is undeniable that the Soviet people underwent a major upheaval, when the country retreated from the major war and succumbed to civil war. To think that the ‘crisis’ from 1985 onward was an insurmountable challenge would therefore be invalid, after all, the USSR had survived far greater calamities after the Second World War.

Although the economy of the USSR was slowing down in the 1980s, economists still saw the single digit GDP growth as manageable, one that did not threaten the stability of the country’s economy. Although the price of oil surely caused trouble to Soviet finances, adjusted for inflation, the price of oil was higher than in the previous decade.

The Soviet Union’s military and diplomatic standing is correctly judged as having accomplished or managed well it’s objectives in the 1970s through to the 1980s. Even with Reagan’s military buildup, especially with the threat of SDI, this did not receive serious attention by military and economic planners in the USSR; simply SDI was treated as unfeasible in the short to medium term. Years later, historian Adam Ulam would quip that in 1985, “no government of a major state appeared to be as firmly in power, and its policies as clearly set in their course, as that of the USSR.”

The real situation then was, as with the previous decade, the USSR of the 1980s was a stable one, with no unemployment, no inflation, no mass protests and strength in its foreign policy. There were problems, but there was clearly no real crisis that can threaten the country’s existence. Perhaps more importantly for a country that had many autonomous republics and regions; there were no observable conflicts among its nationalities and ethnicities.

Even with a one-party system, the Soviet bureaucratic machine had many decision makers from top to bottom. Millions participated in the collective soviets, which are institutions of power. More than 150 million workers were involved in unions, and contrary to bourgeoisie denunciations, these institution are not ‘fake’ and functioned with vitality and much room for policy. As for the people themselves, a referendum as late as 1991 showed that the majority of Soviet people (75 percent) where in favor of keeping the Union intact.

Indeed even during the end of the 1980s and early 1990s, the Soviet central planning in politics and economics was more complex than ever because of the expansion of the economy and the increased freedoms of its people. In fact, as Roger Keeran says “it was the erosion of planning and the flowering of the second (underground) economy that raised barriers to economic growth in the USSR.”

As for the Soviet leader himself, Thomas Kenny rightly observes that “we do not believe that Gorbachev ever acted consciously at the outset to betray socialism and restore capitalism. In contrast to Andropov, who was a deep and genuine Marxist-Leninist, Gorbachev was a brilliant actor…without great theoretical preparation” but that over time Gorbachev “took the conscious decision that he was no longer a communist, but a social democrat…he no longer believed any more in planning, social ownership of the means of production, the role of the working class, socialist democracy.”